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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3156
___________
PHILIP CARROLL,
Appellant
v.
TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT LAUREL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-05515)
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
                                                     (Opinion filed: March 03, 2009)                                        
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Philip Carroll appeals from an order of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey granting the Township of Mount Laurel’s motion for summary
judgment in an action seeking “redress” for an allegedly “uncompensated regulatory
taking of his private property.”  We will affirm the District Court’s order.
       “A letter of interpretation does not grant approval to conduct any regulated1
activities. The sole function of a letter of interpretation is to provide or confirm
information about the presence or absence, boundaries, and/or resource value
classification of freshwater wetlands, transition areas, and/or State open waters.” 
N.J.A.C. § 7:7A-3.1(b)
2
Because the District Court’s ruling contains a thorough recitation of the
facts, we will not discuss them in detail; rather, we will briefly describe the undisputed
relevant events leading to this action.  Carroll owns approximately 14 acres located
between Route 38 and Union Mill Road in the Township of Mount Laurel, New Jersey. 
In September 2004, Carroll entered into an agreement to sell the property to the
Township.  The agreement was never consummated, however, because Carroll was
unable to satisfy a condition of the sale, namely, receipt of a Letter of Interpretation
(“LOI”) from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”),
“showing no greater degree of constraint caused by wetlands on the property than that
shown” on prior environmental reports.   1
In September 2005, the Township Council passed a “Resolution Creating a
Preserved Corridor Along Portions of Union Mill Road” (the “resolution”), including
Carroll’s property.  The resolution stated that the Township “is desirous of pursuing the
preservation for the corridor along Union Mill Road . . . so that commercial development
along State Highway 38 . . . cannot and does not negatively impact the largely residential
corridor now existing at that location.”  Therefore, it was resolved that “it is the Policy of
the Township . . . to protect this corridor . . . from incursion of commercial or non-
       The District Court also dismissed as moot motions filed by Carroll seeking summary2
judgment and dismissal of a counterclaim filed by the Township.  The Township had
agreed to the dismissal of the counterclaim if its motion for summary judgment was
granted.
       Our review of the District Court’s ripeness determination is plenary.  See Sameric3
Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 597 (3d Cir. 1998).  
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residential development.”  The resolution indicated that the Township would “take
immediate steps to notify property owners along this corridor that the Township is
communicating with its open space consultant to define the proper amount of property
along the . . . corridor to adequately protect Union Mill Road from commercial uses,
including traffic and the noise therefrom.”  Finally, the resolution directed the Township
Manager and Township Solicitor to “immediately communicate with the Township’s
open space consultant, . . . and proceed expeditiously with providing recommendations to
the Township Council for action on this issue.” 
Just over a year later, Carroll filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that the resolution effected an “uncompensated regulatory taking of his
private property[,] . . . which has totally deprived him of all economically beneficial use
of his land and economically impacted him by interfering with his legitimate and distinct
investment-backed expectations for it.”  The Township filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Carroll’s claim was not ripe for adjudication.  The District Court
agreed, and granted the Township’s motion.   Carroll appealed.2 3
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to state and local governments
4under the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.  U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; Cowell v. Palmer Township,
263 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2001).  “The general rule at least is, that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”   Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  “A court cannot
determine whether a regulation goes ‘too far’ unless it knows how far the regulation
goes.”  MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). 
Consequently, a claim that the application of a government regulation effects a taking of a
property interest is not ripe until (1) “the government entity charged with implementing
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to
the property at issue,” and (2) the property owner has “unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such
compensation[,]” if those procedures are adequate.  Williamson Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 195 (1985).  These requirements “inform[] the
constitutional determination whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of ‘all
economically beneficial use’ of the property, . . . or defeated the reasonable
investment-backed expectations of the landowner to the extent that a taking has
occurred.”  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (internal citations
omitted); see also Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1291 (3d Cir.
1993) (“This finality rule recognizes that, with respect to zoning disputes, a property
       Carroll did not bring a facial challenge to the resolution, see County Concrete Corp.4
v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that a facial attack on a
zoning ordinance did not need to comply with the finality rule of Williamson County), nor
did he argue that the resolution lacked a public purpose, see Carole Media LLC v. New
Jersey Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that “unlike the Just
Compensation Clause claim at issue in Williamson County, a Public Use Clause claim is
ripe before the plaintiff seeks just compensation through state procedures because such
‘proceedings do not supply the appropriate remedy.’”) (citation omitted).
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owner suffers no mature constitutional injury until the zoning authority defines the
application of the zoning ordinance and defines the harm to the owner.”). 
Carroll claimed that, prior to the resolution, the property was zoned as an
industrial district, in which residential uses are prohibited.  He argued that by stating a
policy of protecting the area in which his property is located “from incursion of
commercial or non-residential development,” the resolution effectively prohibited all uses
(industrial, commercial, and residential) of his property.   Importantly, however, Carroll4
has not sought approval to develop the property, nor has he applied for variances from the
perceived zoning restrictions.  Indeed, the legal effect of the Township’s resolution –
which merely stated an intention to protect the area from commercial or non-residential
development – is not clear.  Because the extent of a restriction, if any, on the property is
not known, a regulatory taking has not yet been established.  See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
620-21 (recognizing that “[u]nder our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or
regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the
landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory
6agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the
property, including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.”). 
Therefore, Carroll cannot at this time show a violation of the Just Compensation Clause,
and the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Township.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
